Xi Jinping is a man on a mission. After coming to power in late 2012, he moved rapidly to consolidate his political authority, purge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of rampant corruption, sideline his enemies, tame China’s once highflying technology and financial conglomerates, crush internal dissent, and forcefully assert China’s influence on the international stage. In the name of protecting China’s “core interests,” Xi has picked fights with many of his neighbors and antagonized countries farther away—especially the United States. Whereas his immediate predecessors believed China must continue to bide its time by overseeing rapid economic growth and the steady expansion of China’s influence through tactical integration into the existing global order, Xi is impatient with the status quo, possesses a high tolerance for risk, and seems to feel a pronounced sense of urgency in challenging the international order.
Why is he in such a rush? Most observers have settled on one of two diametrically opposite hypotheses. The first holds that Xi is driving a wide range of policy initiatives aimed at nothing less than the remaking of the global order on terms favorable to the CCP. The other view asserts that he is the anxious overseer of a creaky and outdated Leninist political system that is struggling to keep its grip on power. Both narratives contain elements of truth, but neither satisfactorily explains the source of Xi’s sense of urgency.
A more accurate explanation is that Xi’s calculations are determined not by his aspirations or fears but by his timeline. Put simply, Xi has consolidated so much power and upset the status quo with such force because he sees a narrow window of ten to 15 years during which Beijing can take advantage of a set of important technological and geopolitical transformations, which will also help it overcome significant internal challenges. Xi sees the convergence of strong demographic headwinds, a structural economic slowdown, rapid advances in digital technologies, and a perceived shift in the global balance of power away from the United States as what he has called “profound changes unseen in a century,” demanding a bold set of immediate responses.
By narrowing his vision to the coming ten to 15 years, Xi has instilled a sense of focus and determination in the Chinese political system that may well enable China to overcome long-standing domestic challenges and achieve a new level of global centrality. If Xi succeeds, China will position itself as an architect of an emerging era of multipolarity, its economy will escape the so-called middle-income trap, and the technological capabilities of its manufacturing sector and military will rival those of more developed countries.
― Xi’s Gamble, The race to consolidate power and stave of disaster by Jude Blanchette, July/ August 2021, Foreign affairs
Am not a China watcher or an expert. I have been reading on China and Chinese communist party on 100th anniversary of CCP. We have seen China is not a economic monolith when you factor per capita GDP ( Project syndicate), success of CCP based on ruthlessness, ideological agility and the fact its not turned into a Kleptocracy ( The Economist) in earlier blog posts. It’s only fair as a trilogy to understand the man of the moment Xi Jinping. The undisputed leader who has served as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2012, and President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2013.
The world order has changed much since Xi’s predecessors Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. Jude Blanchette writes in a well written piece for Foreign affairs and I quote:
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping demonstrated strategic patience in asserting China’s interests on the global stage. Indeed, Mao told U.S. President Richard Nixon that China could wait 100 years to reclaim Taiwan, and Deng negotiated the return of Hong Kong under the promise (since broken by Xi) of a 50-year period of local autonomy. Both leaders had a profound sense of China’s relative fragility and the importance of careful, nuanced statesmanship. Xi does not share their equanimity, or their confidence in long-term solutions.
― Xi’s Gamble, The race to consolidate power and stave of disaster by Jude Blanchette
Deng Xioping’s 24 character strategy ” Hide our capabilities and bide our time, make some contributions” seems to be a thing of past in favor recent belligerent times of ” Wolf warrior diplomacy.” The times they are a-changin’..
India’s former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale in a well argued piece for The Hindu last year ” The changing nature of Chinese diplomacy” and I quote
Deng died in 1997. China prospered just as Deng had imagined. It began to occupy centre stage in world diplomacy, but the ship began to come apart from its moorings. A new generation of diplomats, with knowledge of the English language and a careerist mindset, has started to whittle away at the anchors laid down by Zhou and Deng. Arrogance has replaced humility. Persuasion is quickly abandoned in favour of the stick when countries take actions contrary to Chinese wishes. The Chinese pursue unilateralism instead of compromise in the South China Sea. In place of ‘united front’ tactics, they are bent on creating irritations simultaneously with multiple neighbouring countries. To avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation’ that China endured in the hands of western imperial powers from roughly 1839-1840 to 1949, they adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, uncaring that much of the world has done nothing to China and, indeed, shares a similar historical experience.Statements of fact or reasoned opinion are seen by them as insult or humiliation. Foreign governments are educated about their responsibilities in managing the media and the narrative, even as the Chinese manipulate the same media to serve their purposes. They expect to receive gratitude for everything they do, including handling COVID-19, as if it was only done with the foreigner in mind. The veneer of humility has thinned. The reserves of goodwill are fast depleting. The ship seems to be adrift at sea.
― The changing nature of Chinese diplomacy, Vijay Gokhale, The Hindu
China’s global aspirations for a multi polar world where China is an important player and sense of urgency to claim its place, consequent wolf -warrior diplomacy, this new assertiveness is one part, the other part is its investment on artificial intelligence and digital technologies, perhaps moving away from Deng’s focus on ” market socialism” which is a worrying sign for Chinese economy with it’s all pervasive focus on CCP and a compliant business, Internal security and world affairs.
Xi Jinping is on a mission.
I leave you with this quote from Jude Blanchette in Foreign affairs piece:
Xi is willing to forgo a boost in China’s international financial prestige to protect the party’s interests and send a signal to business elites: the party comes first. This is no David and Goliath story, however. It’s more akin to a family feud, given the close and enduring connections between China’s nominally private firms and its political system. Indeed, nearly all of China’s most successful entrepreneurs are members of the CCP, and for many companies, success depends on favors granted by the party, including protection from foreign competition. But whereas previous Chinese leaders granted wide latitude to the private sector, Xi has forcefully drawn a line. Doing so has further restricted the country’s ability to innovate. No matter how sophisticated Beijing’s regulators and state investors may be, sustained innovation and gains in productivity cannot occur without a vibrant private sector.
― Xi’s Gamble, The race to consolidate power and stave of disaster by Jude Blanchette, July/ August 2021, Foreign affairs
China must give latitude to its famed entrepreneurs who are a game changer in digital space for continuous innovation. Anything else would have disastrous consequences.
More of that and more please do read Jude Blanchette well argued piece in foreign affairs.
Remember..
Oh and one more thing
You aren’t going to like
What comes after America
― Leonard Cohen
Sincerely, Suresh
PS : Xi’s Gamble, The race to consolidate power and stave of disaster by Jude Blanchette. Reference :https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-22/xis-gamble?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=Xi%E2%80%99s%20Gamble&utm_content=20210625&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017
The changing nature of Chinese diplomacy, Vijay Gokhale. Reference:https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-changing-nature-of-chinese-diplomacy/article31626501.ece
(All my learning and work stems from books and free resources. Am nakedly open source. freedom to learn, iterate and express is important. Internet should be free. So must freedom to express. Thank you.)